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Abstract: External hazard factors as natural events and intentional acts of interference are perceived 
as important threats affecting the safety of chemical and process plants. The increasing 
frequency of some natural events having a particularly high severity also raised a growing 
concern for industrial asset integrity and for the consequences of major accident scenarios 
that may be triggered by natural events. The specifi c features of technological accidents 
triggered by natural events were recently recognized, and these scenarios are now indicated 
as NaTech (Natural-Technological) accidents. The analysis of past accident databases 
points out that NaTech accidents frequently impacted industrial facilities. Methodologies 
and tools for the specifi c assessment of the potential consequences of NaTech accidents 
were only recently developed, and are still missing for a number of specifi c NaTech 
scenarios. In the present contribution, a framework for the analysis of NaTech accidents is 
proposed and recent advances in the tools available for the assessment of NaTech events 
are revised.
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Technological accidents.
Introduction
In recent years, a number of intense natural events 
impacting on industrial infrastructures triggered 
severe technological accidents. The possibility of 
damage of process equipment due to the impact of 
natural events is well known in industrial practice. 
The term “NaTech” (Natural-Technological) events 
was introduced to identify this category of accidents.
The traditional approach to the prevention 
of NaTech scenarios is usually based on design. 
Conventional design approaches include protection 
from lightning and account the additional stresses 
due to wind, snow, and seismic events. Actually, the 
conventional approach to the prevention of such 
accidents is a deterministic method encompassed in 
design standards. Almost all national and international 
design standards address the issue of additional loads 
induced by natural events (earthquakes, wind, waves, 
lightning, etc.). However, conventional approaches are 
usually deterministic: on the basis of natural hazard 
assessment, a reference event is assumed (a reference 
earthquake, maximum snow coverage, a maximum 
wave height, a maximum wind speed, etc.) and an 
equivalent load is calculated. The design is then carried 
out including the additional stresses deriving from such 
events. This approach is widely used with effective 
results in civil engineering, from which its application 
to industrial equipment design is derived. Thus, 
procedures for the identifi cation of the reference event 
to take into account in design are mostly derived from 
those developed for structural integrity of buildings or 
civil structures. However, when addressing the issue 
of residential buildings, usually the main point is to 
avoid the collapse of the building. On the contrary, in 
the context of a chemical or industrial plant, the issue 
is that the residual functionality should assure the 
containment of the dangerous substances present inside 
process equipment, avoiding loss of containment. 
Clearly enough, this leads to specifi c requirements 
seldom recognized at design level.
A further issue is that usually protection by 
design is assumed to be “perfect”. That is, no 
measure is taken to manage the exceedence risk. 
Thus, if the severity of the natural event exceeds that 
taken as a reference in design, unforeseen accident 
scenarios may take place for which no preparedness 
and no mitigation or emergency procedure is 
present. This is actually what happened in the recent 
accident involving the Fukushima nuclear power 
plant, although stress tests carried out in the nuclear 
industry evidenced a generally limited preparedness 
to natural events having a severity exceeding that 
assumed in the design case. In the chemical and 
process industry, an even lower preparedness was 
experienced e.g. during the severe hurricanes that 
involved the Gulf of Mexico in recent years (Cruz 
and Krausmann, 2008; Cruz and Krausmann, 2009).
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Even leaving apart the Fukushima event and 
the other events related to the 2011 earthquake and 
tsunami in Japan, past accident analysis clearly 
points out that natural events have triggered 
a number of severe accidents in the chemical and 
process industry due to the loss of containment 
(LOC) of hazardous substances (Lindell and Perry, 
1996; Young et al., 2004; Krasumann et al., 2011a; 
Krausmann et al., 2011b). Industrial accidents 
triggered by natural events were an important cause 
of direct damages to the population present in nearby 
residential areas, due to the accidental scenarios 
triggered by equipment damage (blast waves, toxic 
releases, fi re radiation). Moreover, these events 
were responsible also of indirect damages due to 
the delay of emergency rescue operations, caused 
by the effects of the accidental scenarios involving 
hazardous substances (e.g. in the case of toxic clouds 
or of the spread of fl ammable substances on water). 
Thus, the assessment of the contribution of natural 
events to the hazard associated to the activities of 
the process industry is of utmost importance for the 
protection of the population and for a robust and 
effective emergency planning (Cozzani et al., 2010; 
Renni et al., 2010; Krausmann et al., 2011b). The 
pioneering work of Lindell, Steinberg, Cruz and 
Krausmann lead to recognize the specifi city of such 
accidents, due to several factors, among which the 
main are the following: i) the cause of the event is 
external to the industrial site, thus the prevention 
and mitigation of such events may not be managed 
only at a site level; ii) the extension of the natural 
event triggering the technological accident is wide, 
thus several equipment items may be simultaneously 
affected and loss of utilities may take place, leading 
to common cause failures; and iii) emergency 
response may be hampered or delayed by the natural 
event.
Several studies pointed out the features of 
NaTech scenarios and the need of a specifi c approach 
to the identifi cation and management of hazard and 
risk due to this category of events (Lindell and Perry, 
1997; Cruz, 2005; Cozzani et al., 2007; Cozzani et 
al., 2010). The increasing frequency of severe natural 
events caused by climate changes contributed to 
raise a concern about the consequences of NaTech 
scenarios, both on the population and on strategic 
industrial assets (Salzano et al., 2003; Antonioni et 
al., 2007; Cruz and Krausmann, 2008; Krausmann 
et al., 2011a).
However, even if presently a growing attention 
is devoted to NaTech scenarios, a limited number 
of methods and tools is available for the specifi c 
assessment of NaTech hazard and risk. The 
assessment of the risk related to accidents triggered 
by natural events, as well as to the prevention 
and to the consequence assessment of the specifi c 
accidental scenarios that may take place in NaTech 
events is seldom included in safety studies. In 
the following, some methods for NaTech hazard 
assessment were revised and an approach to NaTech 
quantitative assessment was described.
Materials and methods
Methodologies for NaTech hazard 
assessment
Analysis of past accident databases and 
lesson learnt from case-histories
The analysis of the more important accident 
databases recently carried out in several studies by 
Cozzani, Cruz, Krausmann and coworkers (Campedel 
et al., 2008; Cozzani et al., 2010; Krausmann et al., 
2011) pointed out that at least 3 % of reported major 
industrial accidents should be considered as NaTech 
events. The analysis of past events also pointed out 
the specifi c features of NaTech scenarios deriving 
from the different impact that different natural 
events may have on industrial sites. As a matter of 
fact, while lightning clearly emerges as the more 
frequent cause of NaTech events (Renni et al., 2009), 
earthquakes resulted the events leading to the more 
severe scenarios, due to the contemporary damage 
of a high number of equipment items, as evidenced 
by Tab. 1. This is confi rmed also by the analysis of 
specifi c and detailed case-studies (Steinberg and 
Cruz, 2004, Krausmann et al., 2010). Other studies 
pointed out that fl oods as well as hurricanes (wind, 
waves) are capable of triggering NaTech scenarios 
having specifi c features (Cruz and Krausmann, 
2009; Cozzani et al., 2010).
In particular, the analysis of past accidents also 
evidenced that fi nal outcomes of release scenarios 
induced by natural events may have specifi c elements, 
not possible or unlikely in the case of conventional 
release scenarios. As an example, in the case of 
fl oods reaction of released chemicals with water was 
experienced and the fl ooding of catch basins caused 
extended water and land contamination scenarios 
(Cozzani et al., 2010). Fig. 1 shows an example of 
specifi c event trees that should be considered in the 
analysis of NaTech events triggered by fl ooding.
A more detailed analysis of past accident data 
also allowed the identifi cation of specifi c damage 
modes of process equipment due to the impact of 
natural events. The extrapolation of NaTech specifi c 
observational equipment fragility or vulnerability 
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models was thus possible. Some of these tools, 
having a particular value in the framework of 
probabilistic risk assessment, were obtained by the 
analysis of Natech accidents induced by earthquakes 
(Salzano et al., 2003; Salzano et al., 2009; Antonioni 
et al., 2009).
Thus, the analysis of past accidents points out 
on one hand that natural events are a relevant cause 
of major accidents in industrial sites. On the other 
hand, the outcomes of past accident analysis clearly 
evidence the need of specifi c tools to address the 
analysis and the assessment of NaTech scenarios.
Screening methods
A fi rst level in the assessment of NaTech hazard 
is the identifi cation of the sites where such hazard 
is relevant. The problem is usually of concern at 
district, regional or national level, thus requiring the 
analysis of extended areas. Therefore the assessment 
may be reasonably based on simplifi ed screening 
methods. Cruz and Okada (2008) proposed a detailed 
screening methodology mostly useful at a district 
level. Within the activities of the FP7 iNTeg-Risk 
project, a specifi c task was dedicated to the issue of 
NaTech hazard. A methodology was developed to 
obtain a ranking of the NaTech hazard, based on four 
hazard classes (iNTeg-Risk, 2011). Tab. 1 shows and 
example of the criteria used for the hazard ranking 
on the basis of the expected severity of the natural 
event. More recently, Rota and coworkers proposed 
the application of the Analytical Hierarchy Process 
to screening procedures for the ranking of NaTech 
hazard (Busini et al., 2011). Cozzani and coworkers 
proposed an index method mainly aimed at ranking 
NaTech hazard at a regional or national level (Sabatini 
et al., 2008), as shown in Fig. 2. The application of 
all these methods to case-studies proved to yield 
effective results in the identifi cation of “hot-spots” 
and critical sites where the application of more 
detailed assessment techniques is recommended.
Fig. 1 Post-release event trees for substances 
reacting with water in NaTech accidents triggered 
by fl oods (Cozzani et al., 2010)
Fig. 2 Preliminary ranking of NaTech hazards for 
“Seveso” sites in an Italian region. Red: medium 
hazard; Blue: low hazard
Tab. 1 NaTech hazard ranking with respect to 
earthquake and fl ood expected intensities (iNTeg-
Risk, 2011)
Methodologies for quantitative risk 
assessment of NaTech scenarios
Quantitative Risk Assessment
The issue of extending the bow-tie approach to 
NaTech hazards, schematized in Fig. 3, was proposed 
since the development of the MIMAH technique 
within the ARAMIS project (Delvosalle et al., 
2006). Bow-ties including natural events as failure 
causes were developed in the approach. In parallel, 
Hazard Identifi cation (HazId) Analysis technique 
spread out as a structured review technique able to 
account also threats caused by natural hazards to 
industrial facilities and assets.
Fig. 3 The bow-tie approach extension to NaTech 
scenarios
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More recently, the bow-tie approach was 
extended to allow a comprehensive quantitative 
assessment of the contribution of NaTech scenarios 
to industrial risk. A detailed procedure for the 
calculation of individual and societal risk due to 
NaTech scenarios was developed. Figure 4 shows the 
conceptual fl ow-chart of the procedure. As shown 
in the fi gure, several steps are very similar to those 
of conventional quantitative risk analysis and/or of 
quantitative analysis of domino scenarios (Cozzani 
et al., 2005). Specifi c steps include the identifi cation 
of damage and release states and, mostly, of 
equipment damage probability as a consequence of 
the impact of the natural event. Cascade effects can 
be as well included in the assessment, by a specifi c 
modifi cation of steps 5 and 6.
Fig. 4 Conceptual fl ow-chart for the quantitative 
assessment of NaTech scenarios (Antonioni et al., 
2009)
Fig. 5 Example of individual risk calculation for 
NaTech scenarios: iso-risk curves for atmospheric 
storage tanks (iNTeg-Risk, 2011)
Pilot applications of the methodology lead to the 
calculation of iso-risk curves for chemical plants 
and refi neries. An example of results obtained for 
NaTech scenarios triggered by earthquakes is shown 
in Fig. 5. The approach also allows the calculation of 
societal risk if data is available on the distribution of 
population. An example is reported in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6 Example of societal risk calculations for 
NaTech scenarios: overall expected frequency (F) 
of an accident with an expected number of fatalities 
equal or higher than N
The current work is aiming to consolidate and 
further extend the approach to make possible from 
a computational point of view the assessment of 
cascading events (fi rst level domino effects caused 
by the accident scenarios triggered by the natural 
event) and to include the possible consequences 
of the failure of mitigation systems induced by the 
natural event (e.g. catch basins, fi re deluges, etc.).
Equipment vulnerability models
The detailed quantitative approach presented in 
the previous section is based on the availability of 
models for equipment vulnerability. Several types 
of models may be applied to assess the failure 
probability of an equipment item due to the impact 
of a natural event. Detailed vulnerability models 
based on structural analysis may be developed. 
Observational fragility curves are also available in 
the literature (Salzano et al., 2003; Campedel et al., 
2008; Antonioni et al., 2009; Salzano et al., 2009).
In the framework of quantitative risk analysis, 
simple models are needed to allow the swift 
assessment of a high number of scenarios. Thus, 
fragility curves or simplifi ed probabilistic models 
are the preferred approach to support a quantitative 
assessment of NaTech risk. Tab. 2 shows an example 
of fragility curves for the calculation of equipment 
failure probability as a consequence of a seismic 
event. Several of these observational probabilistic 
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models for categories of equipment are present in 
the literature.
Tab. 2 Values of the probit constants for different 
equipment categories, damage states and fi lling 
levels (Campedel et al., 2008). The constants 
should be used in the following equation: Y = k1 + 
k2.ln(PGA). PGA is the horizontal component of 
peak ground acceleration
Data on equipment failure as a consequence 
of fl oods are scarce in the literature. Antonioni et 
al. (2009) report a general correlation that allows 
a rough estimate of the failure probability. More 
recently, Landucci et al. (2012) have developed 
a simplifi ed approach to verify the structural integrity 
of atmospheric tanks in fl ood events. Fig. 7 shows 
an example of the “failure charts” obtained from 
the approach. Filling level and density of internal 
fl uid resulted to play a key role in determining 
failure conditions. A simplifi ed correlation based on 
the calculation of a critical pressure based on tank 
geometrical features was also proposed (Landucci et 
al., 2012).
Lightning are as well a relevant cause of NaTech 
accidents (Renni et al., 2010). Also in this case, 
the approach discussed above may be applied 
to quantify the risk due to accidents induced by 
lightning. However, observational data do not 
allow the development of vulnerability models for 
failure probability. Renni et al. (2009) and Necci et 
al. (2012) presented an approach to the assessment 
of capture and damage probability, based on an 
electro-geometric model for capture probability and 
on a physical model for damage probability. The 
approach, which is based on consolidated statistical 
data concerning lightning probability and severity, 
provides the lightning damage probability both for 
single, isolated equipment item and for equipment 
items in complex lay-outs, where the mutual 
interference of equipment geometry on capture 
probability can not be neglected. Fig. 8 shows 
an example of capture probabilities calculated 
by this approach for a complex lay-out geometry 
corresponding to a tank farm of an oil refi nery.
Several research groups are working on the 
further development of models to assess the damage 
due to wind, waves and other natural phenomena. It 
is worth to mention the relevant work of Milazzo et 
al. (Milazzo et al., 2012) concerning the expected 
damage due to volcano ash fallout on process 
equipment.
Fig. 7 Example of tank failure charts due to fl ood 
severity obtained from the simplifi ed model 
developed by Landucci et al. (2012). Flood severity 
is expressed as a combination of maximum water 
height and velocity
Results and discussion
The comparison of the results obtained for 
individual and societal risk in the case of NaTech 
events always point out that NaTech scenarios are 
relevant. This is evident e.g. from the analysis of 
Fig. 6, that clearly evidences the importance of the 
accident scenarios induced by earthquakes when the 
overall societal risk is calculated including NaTech 
events.
Actually, the expected frequencies or return 
times of even every severe natural event are high 
if compared to expected frequencies of severe 
technological accidents due to internal failure 
causes. Moreover, the availability of mitigation and 
emergency systems is seldom compromised by an 
“internal” accident, while natural events are likely 
to impact on active and passive protection systems, 
reducing their effectiveness.
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Fig. 8 Lightning capture probabilities for a complex 
tank lay-out calculated using the model proposed 
by Renni et al. (2009). The effect of protection 
rods at the edges of the tank farm on capture 
probabilities is also evidenced in blue
The results obtained from the assessment of 
industrial risk due to NaTech scenarios raise the 
issue of tolerability criteria. As a matter of fact, 
no clear correspondence exists among tolerability 
criteria for natural and technological risks. The 
individual and societal risk due to NaTech scenarios, 
calculated on the basis of the expected frequencies 
of reference natural events, may somehow be 
affected by differences in the procedures used for the 
assessment of return times or expected frequencies 
among natural hazards and technological events. 
Moreover, the real issue for some NaTech scenarios 
should be the analysis of the additional contribution 
to societal risk due to the natural event, not to that 
coming from the industrial facility. The analysis 
of the relevance of risk due to NaTech scenarios 
thus should be carefully analyzed, also considering 
the introduction of specifi c equipment-based or 
site-based criteria (Salzano et al, 2010).
Conclusion
The specifi c features of NaTech scenarios were 
only recently recognized. Since then, a relevant 
research work was carried out to explore the issues 
posed by the identifi cation and assessment of 
NaTech scenarios. Several tools were developed, 
allowing the screening of NaTech hazard and the 
quantitative assessment of risk due to NaTech 
scenarios. However, many gaps still need to be fi lled, 
concerning the assessment of specifi c scenarios, 
the safe design of equipment and the development 
of mitigation and prevention barriers effective for 
NaTech events. Recent events, as the Fukushima 
accident, clearly evidence the importance of proceed 
forward on this route, and in particular to set up 
criteria for the management of the residual risk 
due to the impact of natural events exceeding the 
intensity taken into account in the design case.
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